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Book Review
A History o f  the Cold War and The Clash o f Civilizations 
By Dr. John Lukacz and Dr. Samuel P. Huntington
Reviewed by Christopher Schwartz (Graduate Student)
Dr. John Lukacz’s A History o f the Cold War and Dr. Samuel P. Huntington’s The Clash 
o f Civilizations and the Remaking o f World Order are two that books build upon each other, one 
dealing with the Cold War era, the other with the world emerging after the climax of that most 
epic of modem conflicts. Though written in very different styles and with different 
methodologies, both books take as their starting point the view that the motivating forces of 20th 
Century history—and history to come—is neither ideology nor national interest, but technology 
and, most of all, culture. Both books have as their discipline of origin European studies, but their 
perspectives expand so far as to encompass the whole globe. Thus, these two scholars have 
penned what is essentially “historical philosophy”—a method of analysis that is ethical in 
approach but historical in content, for they derive their respective theories not from abstract 
principles, but from the blood and guts o f lived, raw human events.
In the case of Lukacz, the experience is of the traumatic conflict that cleaved Europe into 
two, the Cold War. It is a titanic struggle between two incredible modem powers vying for 
world supremacy, a Sparta against Athens re-writ stupendously large. He first traces the rise to 
power of Russia and the United States from 1763 onward, and the impact of this rise on 
European affairs up to the 1947 division of the continent into two spheres of interest. Writing in 
1961, he argues that this division is “the supreme condition of contemporary history,” “not the 
Atomic Bomb and not Communism,”1 for it schizophrenically dichotomized the civilization that 
has been the engine of change in world history for 500 years. The change has been racial, 
economic, and most of all, technological, a change that has brought Mankind the closest he has 
ever come to mastery of the physical universe—and the closest he has ever come to total 
destruction.
Military accident (or inevitability) created and re-creates the geopolitical conditions 
defining the Cold War: in order to successfully combat the Nazi power, the two societies 
transformed themselves into technological beasts, and the resultant collapse of Germany caused 
a power vacuum, or more so a power vortex, that quite literally sucked the two into a face-to-face 
encounter on the banks of the Elbe River. The relationship of the two sides, already marked by 
distrust, quickly devolved into the most paranoid suspicions of each other. On the one side of 
the Iron Curtain, the successive presidential administrations viewed the Russians as an 
Antichrist-like, evil collective bent on global dominion and the annihilation of the human
Lukacz, Cold War, p. 3.
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individual; on the other side, the successive premierships viewed the Americans as diabolical 
imperialists intent upon dismantling their rightful Slavic and Central Asian possessions, perhaps 
even going so far as to destroy Russia itself.2
In Part 2, Lukacz appraises the social, material, national, and ideological factors that have 
shaped Russian and American destinies, or as he puts it, “the tendencies of the two societies... of 
their political theories... of the two States... of their national character... [and] their spiritual 
tendencies.”3 His great theme here is the evolution of both societies from agrarianism into 
industrialization and into bureaucratization, the last being their condition at the time he was 
writing. This transformation is manifested in what he calls the “Pioneer State,” the “Welfare 
State,” and the “Administrative State,” the latter a corporate-industrial-bureaucratic monstrosity. 
It is a twist of fate of the greatest kind that the liberalism of the one and the communism of the 
other lead to the rise and expansion of white collar, middle-class existence, and with it, 
“governmental intervention [and] the extension of socialist patterns of life and thought.”4
At the root of Lukacz’s arguments in both parts of the book is that ultimately it is culture 
and not ideology shaping the destinies of the United States and the Soviet Union.5 Their cultures 
are the concoction of historical conditions and innate racial conditions: the missionary 
universalism and boundless optimism of the Americans on the one side, the guarded 
parochialism and boundless paranoia of the Russians on the other side, and the peculiar fatalism 
that infects them both. The temptation to drop the bomb and just end it all may be greater in the 
Russians, Lukacz says, but it is dangerously present in the Americans as well. Whether fatalism 
or survivalism prevails depends upon the two societies’ conscious relationship to Europe, 
specifically, if they come to conceive of themselves as European or not: “It is this precious 
unique Christian doctrine o f Free Will, leading to the will to live, that the European heritage may 
bequeath to both.”6 The Cold War is, then, really not so much even about culture, but about the 
purpose and persistence of human existence itself.
For Samuel P. Huntington, the experience at the center of his book is what happens after 
the Soviet Union dies and Europe unifies. His defining experience is not of a modem Sparta 
against Athens, but of an all-out clash between Sparta, Athens, Persia, Egypt, et al.—an 
Olympics waged at a global scale with Kalashnikovs, nukes, and suicide bombers. His thesis is 
that “In a post-Cold War world, for the first time in history, global politics has become 
multipolar and multicivilizational.”7 Writing in 1996, he sees economic and armed competition 
between pan-national group identities as the true shapers of patterns in war, peace, and 
development in the late 20th and early 21st Centuries. As the old ideology-based alliances and 
arrangements of the Cold War give way to new alignments structured according to “blood, faith, 
and language,” every conflict between groups risks becoming an ethnic cleansing, a holy war, 
and, given the right circumstances, a world war.
Is Europe again at the center of this development? Not exactly, for all that the Cold War 
really accomplished was to channel and otherwise smother these ethno-religious rivalries, not 
resolve them, as the bloody dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia demonstrates. In 
terms of contributions, we must go further back, to colonialism, in which case Europe is
2 Ibid., pp. 72-77.
3 Ibid., p. 214
4 Ibid, p.227
5 Actually, the most recent scholarship coming out does demonstrate that ideology played a significant world. For 
example, read Vladislav Zobok’s Inside the Kremlin's Cold War.
6 Ibid., p. 339
7 Huntington, Clash, p. 21.
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responsible for the cartographical and technological conditions underlying the Clash of 
Civilizations, and to some extent, by bequeathing economic liberalism to regions such as East 
Asia, it is also the source of the means by which China and its “Confucian” kin are now rising 
toward hegemony. In fact, Europe and her offspring the United States and Australia—the 
West—is simply one civilization among all the others, and it is in decline.
Why the West is diminishing has everything to do with mentality. Ideologically, 
Europe’s contribution is about nil—and here is the most disturbing element of Huntington’s 
thesis—for in the emerging world we are not dealing with nationalism per se, argues Huntington, 
but older, in some cases ancient, modalities of identity. The conflict between the civilizations of 
Islam and the West is really the age-old contest between Persia and Greece; the antagonism of 
Orthodoxy and the West is really the schism of 1054, and even earlier, of Byzantium and Rome; 
and so on. Furthermore, the mentality is intrinsically not modem, but primitive: “civilizations 
are the ultimate human tribes, and the clash of civilizations is tribal conflict on a global scale.”8 
The definition of the self by what and who it is not, genetically, linguistically, and doctrinally; 
the self-centered drive to horde any and all natural resources; the quick turn to armed, ferocious 
violence; and the persistence of extremism and winner-take-all vying over moderation, 
negotiation, and compromise (“a history of off-again-on-again slaughter”)—all these derive 
more from our simian past than our evolved future. Thus, in the emerging Darwinian world, the 
West is uniquely unfit for survival, for its perspective and aspirations are universalistic, while the 
geopolitical environment around us is becoming rabidly particularistic.9
As with Lukacz, what is it at stake in Huntington’s thesis is the very continuance of 
human existence. The difference between the Cold War and this present Clash of Civilizations, 
however, is not fatalism against survivalism—in reality, we are dealing with survivalism run 
utterly amok. The question is whether we survive as a civilized species, or as barbarians. To 
Huntington, “civilization” as a concept is not simply urbanized, sophisticated living, nor is it a 
set of beliefs and rituals with a specific intellectual content and emotional texture; it is, 
ultimately, matters of morality, faith, and co-existence that transcend all differences. The irony 
is that by fanatically focusing upon our differences, our species risks becoming blind to, and then 
obliterating, what makes us a species: our shared human spirit. “In wars between cultures, 
culture loses.” 10
At what point does an historian or political scientist become a philosopher? Lukacz and 
Huntington provide us a model for such a transformation. It occurs when a scholar evolves 
beyond the petri dish mentality to that of the eagle, soaring over time, space, and human 
experience, aiming toward abstraction: “If we are to think seriously about the world, and act 
effectively in it, some sort of simplified map of reality, some theory, concept, model, paradigm, 
is necessary,” writes Huntington.11 “I believe that just as the essence of our Christian heritage is 
the unique Teaching of Charity, the purpose of knowledge, and especially historical knowledge, 
is Understanding,” writes Lukacz. “History tells us more about human nature than does 
science... the quality of historical truth is such that it may be understood by anyone whose 
willingness to read or to listen reflects the willingness of his heart.”12
8 Ibid, p. 207
9 Ibid, pp. 301-321
10 Ibid, p. 252
11 Huntington, Clash, p. 29
Lukacz, Cold War, pp. xi-xii12
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Both scholars are men who have experienced their subjects firsthand. Lukacz is an 
expatriate from Hungary, where he suffered persecution under the Nazis and subsequently fled 
the Soviet onslaught. Huntington is a Cold Warrior who, as an advisor to President Lyndon B. 
Johnson as well as an expert in the relationship of military, civilian government, and the 
phenomenon of coup d ’etat, participated in and witnessed the demise of the United States’ 
communist nemesis and the eruption of our transnational era. As a result, they bring into their 
analyses a vivid sense of familiarity, of having been on the frontlines of sweeping historical 
change.
In terms of style, though, only Lukacz’s reflects this familiarity. His writing actually has 
a strong resemblance to the high-flying, epic prose of comic book authors, especially those who 
worked in Marvel Comics, Inc. during the 1960s and 70s. This may be symptomatic of his 
ethnic background,13 as well as his many years in teaching, during which he undoubtedly faced 
the challenge of constantly developing new and magnetic ways of holding his students’ interest. 
Huntington, on the other hand, has the technician’s dryness one would naturally expect from a 
political scientist who has spent a lifetime writing papers for think tanks and incurious, nearly 
illiterate political figures. The fact that Lukacz experienced the Cold War in the most intimate 
way, as an emigre, while Huntington experienced the struggle and the ensuing post-Cold War 
wars from an office, also explains the religious-like urgency of the first book, and the cold, 
analytical attitude of the second.
What of their theses? Are they sound? Again, Lukacz appears the better o f the two. It is 
true that he makes many inversions of common wisdom with little recourse to explanation, and 
unlike Huntington, he provides almost no sources for any of his arguments. The few footnotes 
he does give are never to proof-texts, but philosophical tangents, including one that is over half a 
page long! Nevertheless, the logical cogency of his perspective is, on the whole, potent. His 
position is simple: character, be it individual or societal, creates destiny. He combines Great 
Man theory with Core-Periphery argument, and his development of the characteristics of the two 
nations is rooted in both intelligible historical conditions, such as geography and technological 
development, and a mystical race theory from which arises innate and inexplicable patterns of 
being and behavior that mark all Russians and Americans. By the end of his book, when he 
plays his final card—the presence of a terrible fatalism lurking in both the Russian and American 
psyches among others—the reader truly feels like the Cold War is a titanic struggle of 
mythological proportions.
Huntington, on the other hand, is not as cogent. His definition of civilizations is sloppy. 
For example, his clumping of all Muslim societies, both nation-states and immigrant 
communities in the West into a single civilization is deeply problematic. Asian Muslim 
countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia display far more “Confucian” and “Hindu” tendencies: 
their pluralism, relatively easy-going sexual mores, deference to authority, and capitalistic 
instincts implicate their roots in pre-modem Indian and Chinese colonization more than they 
suggest any commonality with Arabic or Iranian tendencies. The Middle East as a whole, Shia 
and Sunni, has moved inexorably in the direction of a dynamic tension between racialism, 
socialism, and anarchism, shifts that have exploded since the Iraq War flared up at the Battle of
13 A significant number of comic book writers of that era and up to today are first or second generation Eastern 
Europeans, all of whom share an attraction to grand, gigantic, scientific-esque themes of race theory, evolution, and 
technology. Take for example Jim Krueger’s magnum opus Earth X, published in 2000, the premise o f which is 
what the earth is like after every single human being abruptly manifests a superpower.
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Fallujah.14 Central Asia has displayed similar tendencies, though there it seems to increasingly 
be going down a tumultuous path of democratization or authoritarian-democratization, as in the 
case of Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, the parliamentary peace-making in Tajikistan, and even 
the faux referendum in post-Turkmenbashi Turkmenistan. Meanwhile, North Africa is evolving 
far more erratically—within the northern coast of the al-Maghreb there are a bewildering variety 
of political systems, including a monarchy, a military junta, a socialist-religious commonwealth, 
and two authoritarian republics—than either the Middle East or the former Soviet Muslim 
territories, and it is light years away in difference from Asian Muslim countries. Indeed, North 
Africa is perhaps very instructive of the conceptual problems inherent to Huntington’s theory. 
How does one apply his theory to conflicts such as that in Darfur? There we see Arab Muslims 
fighting African Muslims. Is this a case of an intra-civilizational civil war, or an inter- 
civilizational war between Africa and Islam?
Huntington’s definition of civilizations is also inconsistent. For example, he categorizes 
Japan as a distinct civilization from “Sinic” civilization (China, et al.). A chief characteristic he 
attributes to Sinic civilization is its members’ submission to hierarchical authority, a tendency to, 
as he puts it, “bandwagon” with whoever is the hegemonic power. Yet, he never attributes any 
characteristics to his conception of Japanese civilization, and then he goes on to predict that 
Japan will bandwagon with China, and Viet Nam, a member of Sinic civilization, to attempt 
rebelling. According to his logic, it is Viet Nam which should be a standalone civilization.
What of his predictions? As it so happens, Japan is in fact seeking to balance or outright 
counter China, while it is Viet Nam who is bandwagoning. However, this is only one instance of 
time proving him wrong; for the most part, he has been dead-on. Among the developments he 
foresaw are many of the major elements of the post-September 11th present: a “quasi-war” 
between the West and (Arab) Islamic countries; the position of Russia as a “swing” state 
between a rising China and a declining America; the difficulties the United States faces with its 
identity and Latin immigration. A recent BBC article, “Perils of a New Pacific Arms Race,”15 is 
just one of numerous pieces of journalism in the last decade that would appear to bear out the 
utility of Huntington’s theory.
Does realpolitick have any place in Huntington’s theory? He argues that while the so- 
called “realist” school of political science approximates the closest to his thesis, it nevertheless 
misses out on the essential point: civilizational loyalties will trump old fashioned national 
interest. Even the eternally Machiavellian ambitions of the power-hungry, he contends, will 
serve civilizational agendas. However, he simultaneously argues that the West must close ranks 
lest its differences be exploited by other civilizations, and that Islamic civilization, as it lacks a 
central “core state,” can be also be manipulated and directed by the Sinic giant. These 
contradictions to his basic thesis strongly suggest that even by Huntingtonian standards 
civilizations are not monolithic, and that in a future world war between them, intra-civilizational 
civil war is a real possibility.
What Huntington lacks in cogency he makes up for in terror. Since we now know how 
the Cold War resolved, and despite the dourness of Lukacz’s prose, at the end of A History o f the
14 Moreover, he never explains his conception of the relationship of religion to civilizational identity. Among 
societies and scholars who have been studious of the Analects and the Koran, the Chinese, Arabs, and Iranians are 
infamous for playing fast and loose with their scriptures. How can they be characterized as Confucian or Islamic 
when their behavior, in the eyes o f so many, are so distinctly un-Confucian and un-Islamic?
15 Burnell, Paul and Andy Denwood. “Perils of a new Pacific arms race.” BBC News Online. Accessed Tuesday, 
August 14th, 2007. <http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6937293.stm>
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Cold War the reader is left with a real sense of choice. Not so for The Clash o f Civilizations, 
which leaves its reader—or, at least, this reader—with a formidable feeling of despair. If 
Huntington is correct, then it seems that rape, plunder, and ethnic genocide are inevitable, that 
the human species is hell bent on devouring itself in a gluttony of brutality. Ironically, it is for 
this reason that his book is so often misunderstood by critics as an avowal or happy proclamation 
in favor of the Clash; in fact, the whole point of his book is just the opposite, to set up a theory 
for other thinkers to utilize in order to prevent the breakout of an apocalyptic conflagration.
To conclude, the two books, appearances to the contrary, do actually speak to each other. 
Fundamentally, their approach is the same, and the stakes involved—total annihilation in the 
one, total barbarization in the other—are not dissimilar. After all, if humanity descends into out- 
and-out mongrelism, and in the process forsakes the advanced future we could attain, we might 
as well perish. And so, taking the two books together, is there a general moral or political 
principle that one can devise about the 20th and 21st Centuries? Yes, there is: national character 
in the form of culture, and culture in the form of identity, does create destiny. But what is it?
The America and Russia of Lukacz are self-blind behemoths, woefully lacking in self-knowledge 
and colliding in potentially catastrophic ways. The America, Russia, China, et al. of Huntington, 
on the other hand, are very much conscious of identity. Yet, self-blindness may nevertheless 
persist even in the Clash of Civilizations, for identity is an organic reality, not something 
ideologues can conjure or contrive. Just as blades of grass will push through the thickest of 
concrete sidewalks, the true angels and demons of who we are will push through the facade of 
the illusions we tell ourselves. The question is whether we are willing to be humble and listen to 
these inner, nearly forgotten voices, or dive headlong into madness and destruction. Our future 
may very well be determined, as Lukacz says, by the willingness of the human heart
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